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Abstract 
Present study has focused on riskiness of providing loans as well as loans and reserves policies of banks in the Czech 
Republic. The paper shows how Czech banks are taking more credit risk due to dissolution of credit provisions to their 
incomes even in global financial crisis times. Higher concentration level of credit market and foreign owners of banks are 
typical for this small country. Estimated period is from 2002 to 2011. Methodologically it is used panel GMM regression, 
but on the other hand it is also used basic calculations from annual reports data of Czech major banks in this article. The 
author has argued that Czech banking sector is more risky, which is affected by foreign parent companies. Higher level of 
banks' earnings at the expense of the credit risk then could affect whole Czech economy, if the quality of debtors will 
decrease. There are also some policy implications based on results of the work. These implications are addressed to 
commercial banks, but also to the central bank of the Czech Republic. 
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1. Introduction 
Banking sector plays very important role in bank based financial systems. It finances households and 
companies through providing loans. Paying of our attention should be given to riskiness of providing loans for 
banks therefore. Of course banking sector is regulated by the central bank in the Czech Republic. Banks have 
to generate provisions from loans granted due to the possibility riskiness changing of some loans granted to 
bad loans. Nevertheless, they can also generate provisions and reserves which are tax deductible, too. In times 
of global financial crisis, when the Czech credit market highly increased before that, there is not any logical 
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reason to decrease the both, provisions to loans as well as provisions of banks. All of these issues motivate the 
present study. 
The aim of the current paper is to examine how changed reserves policy of major Czech banks in last 10 
years. This study has also focused on corporate governance issues of Czech banks, which are owned by 
foreign parent companies. The author builds on his recent research, when he has argued that foreign owners 
could affect interest rates' policy of Czech banks or even their credit margins. Contribution of this study is in 
discussion another ways to increase earnings after taxes of Czech subsidiaries to be able pay higher dividends 
to their parent companies. 
2. Literature review 
Sood, 2012, he proved that US banks have strong incentives to use loan loss provisions to smooth their 
income. His study is done for period 2001-2009 on sample of 872 US banks. He argues that banks use loan 
loss provisions more extensively during the crisis period to smooth income upward. Earnings are due to his 
work significantly associated with loan loss provisions after controlling for the regulatory capital management 
incentive pertaining financial institutions. Except other findings he found also that bank holding companies 
tend to engage increasingly in income smoothing when they are profitable. Methodologically he uses 
multivariate panel regression. As variables he uses loan loss provisions to total assets, level of risk weighted 
assets or level of tier capitals and change of net income. Output of his empirical part with pooled data proved 
that loan loss provisions are significantly affected by income smoothing incentives. 
Busham and Williams, 2012, they also proved that forward-looking provisioning designed to smooth 
earnings dampens banks' discipline over their risk taking. Their study examined banks across 27 countries. 
They argue also important and differences within each country. They defined smoothing as the coefficient 
from regression of loan loss provisions. Higher sensitivity of current provisions to current period earnings 
realizations is interpreted as greater discretionary smoothing due to them. They have used also variables as 
loan loss provisions to total assets, but also earnings before loan loss provisions and taxes to lagged value of 
gross loans. Their results strongly suggest, great care must be exercised with respect to allowing more 
discretion into loan provisioning. 
Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2011, they developed a new theoretical model to analyze how provisioning rules 
influence loan market fluctuations. Their study demonstrate that, in looking-forward provisioning system 
where statistical provisions are used to smooth the evolution of total loan loss provisions, the issue of pro-
cyclicality of loan market fluctuations does not exist. They argue, during the downturn specific provisions 
increase and can be greater than latent loses. It means that the fund of statistical provisions previously 
accumulated is used to cope with a numerous contemporaneous problem loans. As a result, statistical 
provisions offset the counter-cyclical evolutions of specific provisions, and total loan loss provisions are 
smoothed over time. They argue therefore, statistical provisions are an alternative to discretionary loan loss 
provisions made for income smoothing. They have also used e.g. a variable as NET loans (gross loans minus 
loan loss provisions) in their model. Due to the fact that loan loss provisions are driven by non performing 
loans, loan loss reserves fit therefore identified problem loans rather than expected loans loses. The 
implementation of their model that allows earlier recognition of credit losses will build up the level of 
provisions at an earlier point in time. It could help financial institutions to cope better with potential future 
risks. 
In the Czech Republic there are bank holding companies owned by foreign capital. Heryán and Stavárek, 
2012, they differ three possible ways for parent companies to get cash flows from their subsidiaries. It is 
possible through dividend policy of course, but also through cash flows in form of interest margin and through 
selling bad assets to Czech banks. Using panel GMM regression model they estimated relationships between 
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foreign owners and domestic companies. Heryán and Stavárek, 2011, examined granger causalities and 
cointegration between interest rates on loans and market interest rates in the Czech Republic and in four 
selected countries of Czech banks' owners (Austria, France, Belgium, and Italy). Current paper has examine, 
if Czech banks use loan loss provisions more extensively during the crisis period to smooth income upward. It 
is possible within maximizing bank incomes through low level of provisions for loan losses (or loan loss 
reserves). 
3. Data and methodology 
Table 1. Five Czech major banks 
 
Bank loans 
mil. CZK  
(100%) 
ČSOB ČS KB Unicredit GE 
Market 
share  
TOP5 
2002 892 371.00 13.58 18.39 17.51 7.78 2.21 59.47 
2003 950 765.90 13.78 20.61 17.96 8.55 2.96 63.85 
2004 1 010 309.30 15.22 22.71 16.87 8.42 3.69 66.91 
2005 1 178 670.40 15.71 20.75 11.86 7.97 4.06 60.35 
2006 1 413 083.50 15.79 20.98 14.43 10.17 4.18 65.55 
2007 1 783 987.60 14.97 21.10 13.88 8.72 4.20 62.87 
2008 2 075 687.50 15.35 19.87 11.10 8.50 4.45 59.26 
2009 2 102 088.40 15.31 20.10 9.66 8.22 5.01 58.29 
2010 2 174 740.00 15.85 19.16 9.62 8.20 5.46 58.29 
2011 2 304 471.10 16.60 19.16 11.33 8.16 5.12 60.37 
 
On table 1 we can see as the Czech credit market has increased in our estimated period. Due to the 
concentration of the credit market we obtained the data of these five major banks in the Czech Republic. All 
of these banks are owned by foreign companies as we see on Table 2. 
Table 2. Foreign owners of Czech banks 
The Czech  
Subsidiary 
Parent  
company 
Parent's  
country 
Česká spořitelna Erste Group Bank Austria 
ČSOB KBC Groep Belgium 
Komerční banka Société Générale France 
Uncredit Unicredit Italy 
GE Money  
Bank 
General Electric  
Company USA 
 
We obtained annual reports data of selected banks from 2002 to 2011. Namely we have used total amounts 
of gross loans, provisions, and provisions from loans (from balance sheet), interest income from loans and 
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provisions for loan losses (from profit and loss statement). In the official English annual reports of Czech 
banks they do not obtained loan loss reserves. They obtained there provisions for loan losses in total amount 
(profit and loss statements), and change of provisions from loans (balance sheet). Therefore we can calculate 
loan loss reserves then. 
Empirically we have followed Haas and Lelyveld, 2010. We have used regression Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) by next equation (1) 
௅௅௉೔೟
ூூ௅೔೟
ൌ ߙ ൅ ௅ோ೔೟ே௅஺೔೟ ൅
௉௅೔೟
ீ௅஺೔೟
൅ ߝ௜௧ ,  (1) 
where ܮܮ ௜ܲ௧  means provisions for loan losses (loan loss provisions) of  banks in time , ܫܫܮ௜௧  is interest 
income from loans, both values from banks' profit and loss statements. ܮܴ௜௧  means amount of provisions, 
ܰܮܣ௜௧ is net loans amount, ܲܮ௜௧  means provisions from loans and ܩܮܣ௜௧  is amount of gross loans, all values 
from banks' balance sheets. Symbol ߙ means a constant and ߝ௜௧ means residuals of panel model. 
4. Empirical results 
Due to non stationarity of two panels we cannot use OLS method. Statistically significant correlation value 
is 0.0268 between our endogenous. Our model is not affect by problem of multikolinearity. The results of 
models, which used orthogonal deviations, could be affected by heteroskedasticity problem. Statistically 
significant correlation value is 0.3793 between value of residuals and significantly endogenous variable
ࡼࡸ࢏࢚
ࡳࡸ࡭࢏࢚. Therefore just results of GMM models using differences are in good condition. 
Table 3. Output of panel GMM estimation  
 Orth. Deviations Differences Differences 
ࡸࡸࡼ࢏࢚ି૚
ࡵࡵࡸ࢏࢚ି૚  
0.3162 a -0.0187 0.0527 
(0.0806) (0.0933) (0.0759) 
ࡸࡾ࢏࢚
ࡺࡸ࡭࢏࢚ 
2.5501 5.5306  
(1.4922) (4.0328)  
ࡼࡸ࢏࢚
ࡳࡸ࡭࢏࢚ 
-2.7580 a -3.2062 a -2.9524 a 
(0.5950) (0.6489) (0.3985) 
S.E. of regression 7.2150 8.3298 7.9999 
Note: Symbol a means statistically significant coefficient at 1% level. Number under coefficient in parentheses means standard error. 
 
Table 3 shows our GMM estimation results. We can see significant impact of provisions from loans on 
gross loans' change to change of provisions for loan losses on interest income from bank loans. It is negative 
impact and it is logical due to increasing of endogenous value, which means costs for banks. Appendix A 
shows clearly situation in all banks from our sample. We can see amount of net loans and provisions from 
loans in millions of CZK on left hand side. We see that our study covers within provisions quite a bit small 
values from balance sheets. Nevertheless, the costs are definitely on much higher level in comparison with 
banks' earnings after taxes. Changes in development of our two endogenous, which are on right hand side in 
Appendix A, it is more important for examining the risk taking of Czech banks. Logically, if the statistically 
significant endogenous increase in our estimated period, that definitely means costs for banks.  
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In Appendix A we see, that the value of provisions is decreasing in this period. The author of this study 
argues that it is due to smoothing banks' incomes to be able pay higher dividends to their parents. Banks have 
to generate provisions for loans due to regulatory measures of the central bank and increasing amount of loans 
granted in the Czech Republic. But they do not have to generate bank provisions. Generating of provisions is 
totally up to Czech banks. However, dissolution of provisions to their incomes includes also other items than 
credit risk. But we can calculate, how many times is bigger an impact of this dissolution to the credit risk. 
From statements of profit and loss we already know provisions for loans losses and we can count change of 
provisions from loans from balance sheets. If then the first value is smaller than the second, then negative 
value of loan loss reserves ratio (provisions for loans losses/change of provisions) means dissolution of NET 
loan reserves. Conversely, if the first value is bigger than the second one, dissolution means opposite, positive 
number of the ratio. Appendix B shows clearly, how we can perceive development of loan loss reserves ratio. 
Finally then, table 4 shows dissolutions of NET loan reserves into income of banks formulated using loan 
loss reserves ratio. We can see ratio R calculated as provisions for loan losses (profit and loss statement) to 
change of provision for loans (balance sheet). According positive/negative number and according which value 
is larger, we can illustrate dissolution of NET loan reserves into income always as a minus. 
Table 4. NET loan reserves' dissolution of Czech banks 
 R_ČS ▲ČS R_KB ▲KB R_ČSOB ▲ČSOB R_UNI ▲UNI R_GE ▲GE 
2002 1,04 + -0,63 + -0,17 + 7,82 - -1,76 - 
2003 0,23 - -0,40 + -2,44 - -1,26 + -2,60 - 
2004 -0,03 - -44,40 + -0,31 + 1,16 - -1,93 - 
2005 0,67 - -0,79 - 0,34 + -2,82 - -1,62 - 
2006 -12,15 - -1,20 - -0,64 - -0,11 - -16,96 - 
2007 -2,28 - -1,29 - -2,42 - -1,44 - 17,57 + 
2008 -1,58 - -1,16 - 1,31 + -1,08 - -2,38 - 
2009 -1,51 - -2,90 - -1,31 - -1,02 - -1,71 - 
2010 -2,05 - -3,87 - -1,47 - -1,51 - -1,02 - 
2011 3,26 + -5,16 - 9,01 + -14,02 - 32,74 + 
 
As we see from the table 4 NET loan reserves' dissolution to incomes of banks is very actual problem in 
the Czech Republic. Most of our results proved dissolution▲ of it (minus sign). Even in financial crisis times 
almost changes of NET loan reserves was negative. Czech banks generated more reserves from loans, which 
are addresses to possible risks of each loan in these years. But provisions, especially NET loan reserves as 
a part of that, it decreased. Appendix A clearly shows, how increased loans granted, but Appendix B 
demonstrates the fact, NET loans reserves decrease. Banks are generating provisions for loans to avoid 
expected losses and provisions to avoid unexpected losses. There is no good logical reason for decreasing of 
provisions during financial crisis time, when the Czech credit market highly increased before. There is no 
reason except requirements of their foreign owners companies. It is also definitely connected with capital 
adequacy of each bank. Even if the paper has not focused on that and problematic such capital adequacy it is 
very much wider, the author argues that generating provisions have better impact on capital adequacy of 
banks than generating provisions for loans. For everything written above, risk taking of Czech banks is on 
higher level and it means hidden risk for the whole Czech economy. Banks should be more careful in these 
days especially. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
The aim of the current paper was to examine how changed reserves policy of major Czech banks in last 10 
years. As it has been shown, the Czech banking sector is more risky due to NET loan reserves' dissolution of 
banks. Smoothing income of banks through decreasing provisions in financial crisis times is known also 
among other countries in the world. 
We should make some policy implications from present work, too. As first, it is strong recommendation to 
Czech banks to generate higher level of provisions from their income. They behave more risky in according 
with the results of this paper, even in financial crisis times. It could be affected by decisions of foreign parent 
companies, which want to maximize their dividends. Therefore, the author recommends the Czech national 
bank to change current legislative within loans and reserves policy of the Czech banking sector. 
The author is going to find out what concretely and also how it could be change to make the current 
situation better. In future research it is possible to pay more attention to dividend's development of 
subsidiaries, Czech banks. It is also possible to examine whether domestic debtors, especially companies are 
constrained to pay higher interest rates on loans in the Czech Republic. 
Acknowledgements 
Research behind this paper was supported by the Internal Grant Competition of Silesian University within 
the project IGS/23/2013 ‘Riskiness of banking sector's lending policy in the Czech Republic’. 
References  
Bouvatier, V., Lepetit, L., 2012. Provisioning rules and bank lending: A theoretical model. Journal of Financial Stability 8, Is. 1, pp. 25-
31. 
Bushman, R., M., Williams, C., D., 2012. Accounting discretion, loan loss provisioning, and discipline of Banks’ risk-taking. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 54, Is. 1, pp. 1-18. 
Financial statements of the Czech banks (2002-2011). Česká spořitelna (ČS), Československá obchodní banka (ČSOB), Komerční banka 
(KB), Unicredit bank (Unicredit), GE Money bank (GE). 
Haas, R., Lelyveld, I., 2010. Internal capital markets and lending by multinational bank subsidiaries. Journal of Financial Intermediation 
19, Is. 1, pp. 1-25. 
Heryán, T., Stavárek, D., 2012. Influence of the Czech Banks on their Foreign Owners’ Interest Margin. Procedia Economics and 
Finance 1, pp. 168-175. 
Heryán, T., Stavárek, D., 2011. Interactions between interest rates in selected euro area countries and in the Czech Republic. Journal 
of European Economy 10, no. sp1, pp. 147-159. 
Sood, H., A., E., 2012. Loan loss provisioning and income smoothing in US banks pre and post the financial crisis. International Review 
of Financial Analysis 25, pp. 64-72. 
  
324   Tomáš Heryán /  Procedia Economics and Finance  5 ( 2013 )  318 – 325 
Appendix A. Loans granted of five CZ major banks ( > 50% market share) 
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Appendix B. Risk taking of five CZ major banks ( > 50% market share) 
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